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Thesis

THE AESTHETIC OF GEORGE SANTAYANA

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I

This discussion aims to appreciate Santayana's view of the relation of man's sense of beauty to his other senses and to investigate the nature of beauty and art in Santayana. Being neither an interactionist nor a parallelist, Santayana holds that logically there are no connecting links. But although his epistemology asserts the validity of critical realism, his words contain all the wonder of a monk of the Dark Ages that things should be what they are. Sceptical but scolastic, Santayana is the last of the Occasionalists. And even though associational doctrines may be superseded, Santayana has assured his own immortality among the eternal essences, where his ideas will always be susceptible of enjoyment and aesthetic contemplation.

As the following pages propose to set forth, there is a sharp break in nature as Santayana sees it. The subject of Chapter II will be the two disparate worlds of matter and essence. In spite of the fact that aesthetics, ethics, and logic, since they are all forms of thought and philosophy, are inseparable in Santayana, there are nevertheless two ways of meeting beauty in his world, that is, by practicing it or by intuiting it. This chapter discusses the constant dualism running through Santayana's philosophy. His scholastic bent is

seen to incline him toward a belief in the noumenal while his Grecian objectivity firmly postulates the substantial world of matter. Thus a curious theory of aesthetics arises in Santayana. All of man's experience combines the eternal and the moving, the static and the dynamic. Beauty itself is the objectification of one of man's impermanent sensations. Santayana distinguishes sharply between beauty and happiness. His associational theory describes beauty as an individual phenomenon dependent on the character of unique experiences.

The following chapter, Chapter III, will deal with the transition from beauty to art. A survey of what Santayana regards as the origin of art in material existence and of beauty from the meaningful and valuable given will be considered. The part morality plays in art will be discussed, and the nature of the specific arts considered.

Santayana divides aesthetics according as it is didactic, historical, or psychological.[1] The first type comprises the criticism of art, the second deals with the various manifestations of the creative impulse, while the third consists in the attempt to understand the experience of beauty intrinsically as well as in its relation to other elements of experience. Santayana follows this third method. He does not aim to organize and co-ordinate the aesthetic judgment but simply to understand

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[1] SB, 5. (The abbreviations which are used throughout are in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.)

the Gestalt already inherent in the perception of beauty.[2] The Platonic aesthetic is such a Gestalt.

> Those intuitions which we call Platonic are seldom scientific, they seldom explain the phenomena or hit upon the actual law of things, but they are often the highest expression of that activity which they fail to make comprehensible.[3]

In spite of their beauty, such expressions are not explicative of the aesthetic impulse which prompted them. And although "to feel beauty is a better thing than to understand how we come to feel it,"[4] the latter task is the philosopher's prerogative.

Santayana is concerned with the origin of ideals, their comparison with facts, the essential element of beauty, and our sensitiveness to it.[5] In order to understand the conclusions Santayana reaches a knowledge of his whole system is needed, for the premisses of his aesthetic are elaborated in his metaphysic and epistemology.

Therefore this discussion will deal with the bases of Santayana's aesthetic, with his definition of beauty, and finally with his conception of the origin of art. The Conclusion will summarize the chief points of the discussion, maintaining an approach from within the system rather than from without.

The source material is for the most part primary, although occasionally a reviewer or critic may have suggested some modification in the interpretation of the subject.

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[2] Ibid., 7.
[3] Ibid., 8.
[4] Ibid., 11.
[5] Ibid., 13.

II

Since Santayana uses many terms distinctively, a knowledge of the most important is prerequisite to an understanding of his aesthetic. The following chart illustrates the manner in which Santayana divides man's experience into two categories.

BEING	EXISTENCE	BEING IN EXISTENCE
Essence	Matter	Substance
Spirit	Psyche	Self
Intuition	Animal Faith	Instinct
Thought	Conduct	Knowledge
Trope	Flux (Space and Time)	Events and Things
Form	Material	Expression

The first realm is that of Being, the static world of the given, while the realm of Existence is pure space-temporality. Man finds the given through the web of space and time, and thus his first discovery is the dual quality of his life, composed of Essence and Matter.

An essence is for Santayana what an Idea was for Plato or a formal cause for Aristotle. An essence is "ante rem." Essences are without existing. They are changeless, absolute, and eternal. One essence can never become another. Their immutability is all that is.

The monotony of the eternal essences is fortunately relieved by matter, which corresponds to Aristotle's material cause. Nothing can be known about matter except its existence, and all

that can be known about this is that it is material. Yet matter brings essences to life. Materialized, they are the substance of man's experience. This substance, the synthesis of essence and matter, is the habitat of man's self, which reflects its surroundings and comes to have two natures - spirit and psyche. Spirit is man's capacity to deal with essences, while his psyche or physical self effects material equilibrium in existence.

Whether a function creates an organ or vice versa is a matter for biological and psychological dispute, but man's functions in either case parallel his potentialities. Intuition is the act by which spirit comes in contact with essence, and animal faith together with the "shock" of events is the psyche's method of progressing in existence. These functions, whether they precede or modify the self, compose the primary instinct of man or rather his primary instincts, for the synthesis of intuition and animal faith at once breaks up into thought and conduct.

Thought deals with the intuited essences; conduct, with the existence which is believed in by animal faith. Knowledge is less a synthesis of thought and conduct than their proper admixture. For knowledge tries to harmonize the disparate, to understand the given as it comes into the flux of existing space and time.

The form of an event is its trope. A trope is "the essence

of any event."[6] A further discussion of this abstraction of essence from situations is unnecessary to Santayana's aesthetic, which hinges more closely on events and things. These are eddies defined in the flux by tropes. Santayana's thing suggests McTaggart's "vanishing somewhat" and Aristotle's "substance."

In their turn things reflect a dualism of form and material. And because of the variety of man's experience, he associates things and events, and expression arises. Expression is meaning acquired by association become intrinsic.

Thus Santayana's own words have a dual character. They "signify" ideas or essences while they "demonstrate" facts. A philosopher is ultimately reduced to a universe deduced from axiomatic laws and didactic postulates or to a manner of proof similar to primitive gesticulations. Santayana chooses both. He postulates Being and points to Existence, and the rest follows ipso facto.

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[6] SAF, 112.

CHAPTER II

THE BASES OF SANTAYANA'S AESTHETIC

The basic postulate of a man's ideas is doubtless the man himself. Since the famous classification of William James which divided beliefs according to their emotional tenderness or vigor an increasing emphasis has been placed on the influence of a man's temperament on his philosophy. In the case of Santayana his philosophy may be said to be the direct expression of his temperament.

A brillant scholar with nothing of the pedant about him, a poet who enjoyed watching football practice at Harvard, a native of Spain who spent his youth in the tradition of Boston, who learned English when he was nine and later wrote a sonnet sequence in this language which is already a classic, the linguistic ability of Santayana is the natural talent of a Latin mind to translate its emotions into words. Thought itself is for Santayana a form of emotion. Every language is a different phenomenon. The very emotional significance of the formulae of mathematical physics give them their peculiar connotation, untranslatable as the simple melody of Greek or the majesty of a Latin whose every word "is noble and wears the toga."[1] Contemporary grammar cannot duplicate the formal purity of

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[1] SB, 172.

ancient tongues, but Santayana finds in English the medium for "suggestion" and "refinement of sentiment."[2]

Thus the crudity of an inflexion which can only hint at what it means to say becomes the strength of an expression which is conscious. Such a tongue admirably suits the temperament of Santayana for the system of his philosophy is a structure merely by implication. The works of Santayana seek to establish no final postulates nor basic conditions. They are the intermittent exclamations of a man who finds much beauty in the world. Yet underlying the delicate nuances of his experience several assumptions repeat themselves again and again. A scholastic dualism, perhaps a vestige of his ancestry, runs continuously through his musing. To be is always something more for Santayana than to exist - and something less.

Santayana admits that he is "an ignorant man and almost a poet" although he denies being "a poet in the magic sense of the word."[3] He pretends only to unfold the Greek view of things. For, he says, the Greeks have made all the discoveries. "The age of controversy is past; that of interpretation has succeeded."[4] Thus a classic detachment pervades the worlds of fact and idea in Santayana or, as he would say, the realms of matter and essence.

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2 Ibid., 174.
3 SE, 6-7.
4 RCS, 32.

The structure of nature he compares to that of a Gothic cathedral, "a harmony woven out of accidents... and all the more profound and fertile because no mind could ever have designed it."[5] The realms of being and existence are the differentia of experience, which reflects man's dual nature of spirit and psyche. The spirit's function is intuition or the apprehension of essences, those infinite, absolute and eternal goods,[6] while the function of the psyche is animal faith or the impetus which effects action by force of belief in man's capacity to deal with matter.

Essences are figments of thought and imagination, the immutable "forms of everything and anything."[7] They are no Logos but "rather a chaos than a cosmos."[8] Disconnected from space and time, they have neither implications nor consequences. They simply are.

But for man to be satisfied with the pure "given" of the critical realists, the mere inventory of the universe, is for him to lose the beauty and value of events, Essences are goods, yet their logical perfection would have no value without the opportunity which existence affords in its chronologically perservering substance. Preference is as absurd in the realm of being as discrimination is wise in the realm of existence

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[5] COUS, 231.
[6] SB, 59.
[7] SAF, 129.
[8] RE, 82.

whose dimensions constrain men "to appropriate such things as serve their use, perfection, or fancy, and to leave all else alone."[9] As Democritus remarks to the stranger in Limbo, "I daresay there is a poet in every nut and in every berry. But the soul of animals must be watchful; they cannot live on mere hope, fortitude and endurance."[10]

To the spirit "the length of things is vanity and only their height is joy;"[11] To the psyche, which is essentially "a way of living"[12] and "a material system stretching over both time and space,"[13] "compromise seems the path of profit and justice."[14] If the human animal were only spirit, art would be superfluous because intuition supplies its own object. And by seeing all things in their essential beauty the spirit would be unaware of beauty. Comparisons, however, are not odious to the psyche. Indeed, it lives by associations and anticipations. Moving through space and time it can appreciate the changing sequence of a statue's curves or listen to a symphony. The spirit has heard the whole movement at the first chord.

Thus man's spirit is in one sense "a rank outsider."[15] It "has slipped in, as Aristotle says, from beyond the gates."[16] It recognises the beauty with which the psyche is acquainted.

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9 SE, 50.
10 DL, 77.
11 SE, 116.
12 Ibid., 222.
13 Ibid., 221.
14 Ibid., 83.
15 PSL, 66.
16 Loc. cit.

Yet without intuition to apprehend the plurality of the universe, man might never experience more than the dark monism of matter. The spirit knows while the psyche believes. And the world is one of belief and action as well as idea. "In order to exist it must enact itself ignorantly and successively, and carry down all ideas of it in its own current."[17]

Such a world is, of course, arbitrary.[18] But it is based on an instinctive hazard, and instincts constitute Santayana's final criterion. Animals live by the noble strength with which the unsuspecting bull continues to follow the lure.[19]

> There is a steady human nature within us, which our moods and passions may wrong but cannot annul. There is no categorical imperative but only the operation of instincts and interests more or less subject to discipline and mutual adjustment. Our whole life is a compromise, an incipient loose harmony between the passions of the soul and the forces of nature, forces which likewise generate and protect the souls of other creatures, endowing them with powers of expression and self-assertion comparable with our own, and with aims no less sweet and worthy in their own eyes; so that the quick and honest mind cannot but practice courtesy in the universe, exercising its will without vehemence or forced assurance, judging with serenity, and in everything discarding the word absolute as the most false and the most odious of words.[20]

The only reason for one essence to appear in matter rather than another is the Occasionalist's criterion of chance. Santayana never doubts that circumstances are fortuitous.[21] In

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[17] SAF, 48.
[18] Ibid., 49.
[19] EGP, 148.
[20] Loc. cit.
[21] RA, 16.

the unfolding flux ideas and figments occasion spontaneous pauses, and nature is seen to be "material, but not materialistic; it issues in life and breeds all sorts of warm passions and idle beauties."[22]

Had the flux of Heraclitus been disturbed merely by Democritean atoms or by purely rational consciousnesses, its capacity for beauty would have gone unheeded.[23] The intellect deals with fact; the aesthetic and moral activities deal with value.[24] The two latter must be sharply distinguished, since morality constitutes the destruction of impediments which might have prevented the enjoyment of "our holiday life, when we are redeemed for the moment from the shadow of evil and the slavery to fear, and are following the bent of our nature where it chooses to lead us."[25]

So it is unmeaning to speak of art as useless. Utility may justify morality, but an aesthetic judgment justifies itself. The pure moralist is a slave,[26] for he is conditioned by all the evil which it befalls him to avoid. The philosopher of beauty is the supremely free man. And in this way moral value turns out to be instrumental to the intrinsic value of aesthetics.[27]

And the vast grandeur of metaphysics, when its truth has

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22 COUS, 184.
23 SB, 18.
24 Ibid., 23.
25 Ibid., 25.
26 Ibid., 27.
27 Ibid., 28.

ceased to be of practical importance, lies before us like a landscape.[28] The necessity of action has paled before the imaginative beauties of contemplation. But because morality and the attainment of the good are means to the liberation of man's sense of beauty, it does not follow that beauty is dependent on the overcoming of evil. Morality is "the price of human non-adaptation, and the consequence of the original sin of unfitness."[29] The positive pleasure of beauty, however, indicates that man is not entirely out of sympathy with his surroundings, for it is when in all their peculiar uniqueness he appreciates them without ulterior intent that man's surroundings acquire intrinsic value.

Unless there were evil there would be no morality, but as long as there are life and leisure there will be aesthetics,[30] for this is based on the "constitutional sensitiveness"[31] of man, who must be soberly utilitarian in the sphere of morals.[32] Yet even when aesthetics has been differentiated from intellectual and moral functions, it must still be separated within the field of immediately perceived values.[33] Such are all pleasures, but the enjoyment of beauty locates the value in some external object, while sensual pleasures are self-regarding. The sense of beauty is, of course, highly sensual, but the extension of its range prevents the focus of attention becoming the

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28 Ibid., 29.
29 Ibid., 30.
30 Loc. cit.
31 Ibid., 31.
32 Ibid., 35.
33 Loc. cit.

experiencing self.[34] The aesthetic differentia is expressly objectification.[35] Natural appetites are called selfish when they are expressed by one person, but their reference to him contains no more of "himself" than the most diffuse desires of altruistic spirits contain of their "selves." "The content of selfishness is a mass of unselfishness."[36]

While then the substance of aesthetics is far from any selfishness, the qualities of beauty depend directly upon the appreciation of specific selves. "It is unmeaning to say that what is beautiful to one man 'ought' to be beautiful to another."[37] The criterion of the beauty of a work of art is "the degree and kind of satisfaction it can give to him who appreciates it most."[38] And his appreciation depends on training and environment instead of on a universal aesthetic principle. As many types of beauty are possible as man is capable of seeing. They are not incompatible nor contradictory but simply expressive of man's differing visibilities.

And the contemporary tendency to conceive a thing as a "class of classes" and to derive a cohesive and coherent world from a medley of sensations Santayana extends to the psychology of aesthetics. Our primary impulse is to treat each and every sensation as an objectified experience, as arising from the properties inherent in some object. Only later as rational

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34 Ibid., 36.
35 Ibid., 44.
36 Ibid., 39.
37 Ibid., 41.
38 Loc. cit.

beings do we substract from the world of colors and sounds all but its timeful extension in space. Such simplification is thought legitimate by the active intellect, aiming to understand. The aesthetic activity, however, whose function is enjoyment, has not depleted its domain of the first tendency to regard the effects of the world on us as qualities inherent in it.[39]

> We have now reached our definition of beauty, which, in the terms of our successive analysis and narrowing of the conception, is value positive, intrinsic, and objectified. Or, in less technical language, Beauty is pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing.[40]

According to this definition the unseen and the unheard cannot be beautiful. Moreover, the ugly, since it is the absence of good, is excluded from aesthetics, and pleasure, which can be predicated of some part of nature, is alone included.

The functions of man are of prime importance. Those vital functions which preserve individual health are directly proportional to the keenness of his perceptions.[41] His sexual function, on the other hand, makes man susceptible to beauty because it makes him less isolated and less independent.[42] "What is important in emotional life is not which sex an animal has, but that it has sex at all,"[43] for in addition to imparting human sympathy, the sexual function colors all of nature. "For man all nature is a secondary object of sexual passion."[44]

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39 Ibid., 48.
40 Ibid., 49.
41 Ibid., 56.
42 Ibid., 57.
43 Loc. cit.
44 Ibid., 62.

And the reproductive function, by giving rise to social institutions, instigates also social instincts. These are among the most conscious interests of man. It is because the artist's vital and sensual functions have too much usurped his interest that he is so often unhappy.

The pursuit of happiness, then, does not at all parallel the search for beauty. Happiness is the product of one's social position;[45] beauty, of one's senses and imagination.[46] In fact, it "always begins with the senses."[47] The fundamental element of taste is sensuous beauty. "The Parthenon not in marble, the king's crown not of gold, and the stars not of fire, would be feeble and prosaic things."[48]

> The beauty of material is thus the groundwork of all higher beauty, both in the object, whose form and meaning have to be lodged in something sensible, and in the mind, where sensuous ideas, being the first to emerge, are the first that can arouse delight.[49]

Nevertheless, the beauty of form, if not as primary as that of matter, is equally ultimate. If form were expressive of something other than itself, we could not speak of its beauty, for beauty, we have seen, is never instrumental.[50] Thus form has a "specific value" or "emotional tinge"[51] as well as material.

And metaphysically if not aesthetically form is prior to content. We recognize objects as forms in a continuum. "The outlines of most things are symmetrical because we choose what

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45 Ibid., 64.
46 Ibid., 65.
47 Ibid., 79.
48 Ibid., 78.
49 Ibid., 81.
50 Ibid., 83.
51 Ibid., 85.

symmetrical lines we find to be the boundaries of objects."[52] Formal beauty is, moreover, the mark of the aesthetic mind. The Platonic forms, however, are a manifestation of unity in variety and not its explanation.[53]

According to the definition of beauty, all forms are beautiful. But they are not equally beautiful. For since they are dependent on the nature of man, their value will change according as his appreciation of it varies. Santayana's hierarchy of forms is essentially subjective,[54] while his beauty is objective, theories directly inverse to the Platonic doctrine. Santayana would have us find formal beauty in the formless. Nature is chaotic until man perceives it as a landscape.[55]

Apperceptive forms underlie all structure - artistic or scientific.

> A theory is a form of apperception, and in applying it to the facts, although our first concern is naturally the adequacy of our instruments of comprehension, we are also influenced, more than we think, by the ease and pleasure with which we think in its terms, that is, by its beauty.[56]

Perfection is the definite finitude of form. "There are as many kinds of perfection as there are types or forms of apperception latent in the mind."[57]

The sign of progress is discrimination.[58] Nature itself is an organisation of forms, and thus beauty is "the ground of

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52 Ibid., 93.
53 Ibid., 117.
54 Ibid., 130.
55 Ibid., 133.
56 Ibid., 139.
57 Ibid., 147.
58 Ibid., 152.

practical fitness."[59] The human eye, however, does not always in seeing achieve distinction and delight. Perception does not of necessity comprehend nor idealize. Observation leaves room "for hypothesis and for art."[60] "As hypothsis organises experiences imaginatively in ways in which observation has not been able to do, so art organises objects in ways to which nature, perhaps, has never condescended."[61]

> For, after all, it must be remembered that beauty, or pleasure to be given to the eye, is not a guiding principle in the world of nature or in that of the practical arts. The beauty is in nature a result of the functional adaptation of our senses and imagination to the mechanical products of our environment. This adaptation is never complete, and there is, accordingly, room for the fine arts, in which beauty is a result of the intentional adaptation of mechanical forms to the functions which our senses and imagination already have acquired. This watchful subservience to our aesthetic demands is the essence of fine art. Nature is the basis, but man is the goal.[62]

Ideals are "absolute expressions of the passions," but the arts "compound passion with experience."[63] No one essence comes into existence more fittingly than any other. Just as in the unhewn block from which Michel-angelo cut a statue, the ideals which are to be realized in the arts depend "on the genial fertility of things already existing - the artist, his habits, his surroundings."[64] Artists are those performers "singled out from The crowd,"[65] whose suasion leads them to "train themselves to please."[66] Yet "the forms they create, they create spontaneous-

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59 Ibid., 159.
60 Ibid., 161.
61 Loc. cit.
62 Ibid., 165.
63 EGP, 103.
64 RE, 79.
65 RA, 49.
66 Loc. cit.

ly,"[67] and even these forms contain but "a haunting essence, without power to reproduce itself or to exclude any particular sequel."[68]

Thus essences are objectified for a moment in art and imaginative life. The ideal, of course, "can never itself exist, nor can its particular embodiments endure."[69] Since essences are essentially good, when embodied as values in the arts, these are seen to be naturally pleasing. All aesthetic values are therefore beautiful. Some may express the evil and the ugly, but "tragedy and comedy please in spite of this expressiveness and not by virtue of it; and except for the pleasures they give, they have no place among the fine arts,"[70] which should contain "nothing but the good of life."[71]

Santayana's theory of expression accounts for the various forms of beauty by making them the qualities "acquired by objects through association."[72] Thus the beauty of material form in art becomes expressive when a mind "associates" such beauty with an allied "circle of thoughts."[73]

Although association functions in no specific organ, it is a fundamental process in man's consciousness.[74] Pleasure emerges as spontaneously from the perception of relation as from the perception of material and form. "The pleasure of

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67 RE, 79.
68 Ibid., 80.
69 RS, 30.
70 SB, 258-259.
71 Ibid., 260.
72 Ibid., 193.
73 Ibid., 196.
74 Ibid., 199.

association is an immediate feeling."[75]

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75 Ibid., 201.

CHAPTER III

BEAUTY IN ART

"There is no essential difference"[1] between sensation and thought. Our ideas of things are "political caricatures made in the human interest,"[2] and "all theory is a subjective form given to an indeterminate material."[3] Logic, however, adapts one's self to one's environment while ethics inaugurates the reverse process. Aesthetics combines both processes and deals with moments of vital equilibrium between man and nature. In man's artistic construction "well-bred instinct meets reason half-way, and is prepared for the consonance that may follow."[4]

If art were merely a reasonable construct, it could not be free and plastic. To be free means for Santayana to be capable of flux,[5] and reason deals with immutable figments. Yet because "at the center of every natural being there is something individual and incommensurable, a seed with its native impulses and aspirations,"[6] there is a basic freedom in art which accounts for the various media and forms of expression. Instinct and intelligence combine in the Life of Reason, which "in the widest sense of the word might be called Art."[7]

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1 SAF, 102.
2 Ibid., 104.
3 RA, 128.
4 RS, 27.
5 COUS, 211.
6 Ibid., 166.
7 RCS, 6.

A process is merely mechanical until consciousness interprets it in terms of value. Separated from the human bias mechanism contains neither progress nor culmination. "In removing consciousness, we have removed the possibility of worth."[8] The will of man effects the being of ethics and aesthetics. Metaphysical truth depends on the intellect of man. Could he exist an emotionless monad, the perfect reflection of nature, beauty would be inconceivable to him. For his consciousness would then be an apparatus for observing instead of a power for appreciating.

> We might, in a word, have a world of idea without a world of will. In this case, as completely as if consciousness were absent altogether, all value and excellence would be gone. So that for the existence of good in any form it is not merely consciousness but emotional consciousness that is needed.[9]

Thus Santayana's will, contrary to that of Schopenhauer, is in abeyance until the aesthetic faculty is called into operation. Then it is of primary importance. The aesthetic impulse is no vacuous pause but the vital force which furnishes the data for all of man's activities.

The self is a logical figment derived from the compounded objectified interests which give it content.[10] That is, such is the metaphysical self of Santayana, the self justified by reason which must disintegrate before it can understand. Aesthetically

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[8] SB, 17.
[9] Ibid., 18.
[10] Ibid., 40.

Santayana's self has to be an active willing subject. "Our will, as Descartes said in a different context, is infinite, while our intelligence is finite."[11]

A dualism if fact runs through all of Santayana's thought. In the progression of events there is a continual egression of ideals. The realm of poetry is ideal, but when its ideals intervene in experience, poetry becomes religion.[12] Religion, nevertheless, remains relevant to poetic values and human purposes and must always be in this sense allegorical. Such allegory, however, is the basis of creation,[13] for the value of reality is measured by "its relation to the ideal."[14]

Common sense and science themselves "live in a world of expurgated mythology,"[15] and understanding is but an "applicable fiction."[16] Understanding is as spontaneous as imagination and can be discriminated only by being practiced. It is "an imagination prophetic of experience,"[17] and the imagination is "the universal self."[18]

Santayana recognizez an ideal element in all men which deals with the realm of essences. The imaginative faculty escapes the facts of perception and conforms to man's sense of value. Thus it is as relative to humanity as science, but to disavow truth and art on the grounds of relativity is to fall into the logical absurdity of mysticism which "consists in

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11 Ibid., 183.
12 IPR, v.
13 Ibid., ix.
14 Loc. cit.
15 Ibid., 5.
16 Loc. cit.
17 Ibid., 7.
18 Ibid., 9.

the surrender of a category of thought on account of the discovery of its relativity."[19]

The classic spirit and that to which Santayana clings is founded on finitude. Yet Santayana admits that if based on rational postulates, mysticism lends depth to philosophy. "The art of mysticism is to be mystical in spots."[20] Although in no sense superhuman or abnormal, mysticism exaggerates one rational concept to the exclusion of all others. Santayana sees the mystic "as miserable a man"[21] as the mathematician and with the similar aesthetic attitude of cosmic interest. Yet the progress of mysticism annihilates itself. True expansion and perfection are the function of imagination. Too often, however, interpretation mellows into fable, and men cease to accept as valuable what they no longer appreciate.

Aristotle's aim was the ideal of all nature and not of man alone.

> Growth is for the sake of the fruition of life, and the fruition of life consists in the pursuit and attainment of objects. The moral virtues belong to the pursuit, the intellectual to the attainment. Knowledge is the end of all endeavor, the justification and fulfilment of all growth.[22]

The Aristotelian god is the ideal of all reality and "the most philosophical that has yet been constructed."[23] Aristotle's error was to attempt the proof of the existence of god, for ideals give meaning to matter without becoming material.

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19 Ibid., 14.
20 Ibid., 16.
21 Ibid., 19.
22 Ibid., 71.
23 Ibid., 72.

Existence is irrelevant to god, which is the "final cause of nature and man."[24] Final causes are values rather than existents. They combine positive fact with aspiration in one image. Yet while essences are stable, final causes eventually disintegrate into their elements, "some objectified into a physical universe of mechanism and law, others built into a system of rational objects."[25]

For "what is false in the science of facts may be true in the science of values."[26] Existence refers to the mechanism of causal relationships, but function relates to the interest involved in results. "Compared with the ideal, every human perfection becomes a shadow and a deceit."[27] The ideal retains an impersonal character.[28] Platonism consists in the pursuit of permanence behind the relative appearance of phenomena.

At the other extreme lie the "barbarisms" of Whitman and Browning, for whom the passing emotion is a final element. Aristotle links Platonic impersonalism with Brownian expression, and Santayana develops this theory of "the unfolding of a definite nature, the gradual manifestation of a known idea."[29] For ideals are"possible forms of being."[30]

And works of art are these potentialities made actual. The idea itself does not instigate artistic creation. The image and the idea embodied in art are the result of past experience and

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24 Ibid., 73.
25 Ibid., 75.
26 Ibid., 91.
27 Ibid., 126.
28 Ibid., 129.
29 Ibid., 204.
30 LE, 5.

the simultaneous effect of future apprehension. What man says he produces is that which satisfies him. Art, then, rests on the human being's technique and on matter's adaptability. "When men find that by chance they have started a useful change in the world, they congratulate themselves upon it and call their persistence in that practice a free activity."[31] Thus, in art there is the same play of values as in the realm of essence, but in art these values are materialized and made permanent.

Matter's only value consists in the assumption of artistic forms. Art is, of course, dependent for its existence on the material world, but spirit is no more the slave of mechanism than freedom is of duty. First causes are of little "worth."[32] The worthwhile part of action is that it envisages an ideal distinct from the facts it perceives. Otherwise "all life would have collapsed into a purposeless datum."[33] Matter must be susceptible of form and of the definite ideals man wills. Chaos becomes a prerequisite to art, and disorder assumes the character of a kind of form. "Evil is so far from being a propitious formlessness in matter that it is rather an impeding form which matter has already assumed."[34] This so-called formlessness is overcome in two ways: first, by industrial and then, by liberal art.

This molding of matter takes place in nature, "where

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31 RA, 11.
32 Ibid., 22-23.
33 Ibid., 29.
34 Ibid., 32.

nutrition and reproduction fit the body for its ideal functions, whereupon sensation and cerebration make it a direct organ of mind."[35] Industry makes matter tractable; liberal art makes matter expressive. Technique and genius are thus inseparable in the fine arts. So also are utility and spontaneity.[36] In point of history, however, spontaneity preceded usefulness. The spirit of the barbarian embodies beauty automatically, and in uncivilised souls the sense of beauty is most spontaneous.[37] Santayana insists that the spontaneous, because it is irrevocably given, is a fundamental good.[38] All desires are in themselves good. Evil insinuates itself only in the synthesis and conflict between desires. All the moods of nature are innocent; "it is only on meeting that they blush."[39] The sin of materialism is due to no inherent quality of matter but to the incapacity of matter to embody all essences and ideas. Only teleologically can there be sin, and then the conflict is not in nature but in man's mistaken notion of what nature should be.

The moral view of aesthetics, however, pays art a great tribute, for it endows art with purpose and regards it as comprehensive of life.[40] Thus, "the criticism of art is a part of morals."[41] All interests in life are inter-woven, and ideals are formed from many disparate tendencies, so that aesthetic values need more justification than the mere affirmation of

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35 Loc. cit.
36 Ibid., 37.
37 Ibid., 38.
38 Ibid., 166-167.
39 Ibid., 168-169.
40 Ibid., 177.
41 Ibid., 178.

their essential goodness. They must be justified as one element among many and their influence on other values must be shown to be efficacious.

As Santayana has said above, "the order of values inverts that of causes."[42] Experience is more valuable per se than the organic functions which generate it or the essences which pervade it. Although "thought is a controlled and consistent madness,"[43] the evaluation of thought's excellence remains one of the functions of society.[44] The great moments of human life are the subject matter of the "noblest" art.[45] And since human life has its source in natural causes and mechanism, this is the "source of beauty."[46]

> Beauty is a free natural gift. When it has appeared, we may perceive that its influence is rational, since it both expresses and fosters a harmony of impressions and impulses in the soul; but to take any mechanism whatever, and merely because it is actual or necessary to insist that it is worth exhibiting, and that by divine decree it shall be pronounced beautiful, is to be quite at sea in moral philosophy.[47]

But the constitution of beauty is teleological. Art is in fact the form teleology takes in society.[48]

Now that aesthetic value has arisen, its cause is seen to be ridiculously small in comparison with its magnificent effect. Matter and mechanism dwindle in the light of what they bring into existence, for "what is primary in the order of genesis is always last and most dependent in the order of worth."[49] Yet

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42 Ibid., 45.
43 BHMO, 250.
44 RA, 51.
45 Ibid., 122.
46 Ibid., 124.
47 Ibid., 130.
48 RM, 119.
49 RA, 22-23.

just as morality often serves beauty when the latter has to be reached by effort, so industrial art is the instrument of approach to the fine arts. Industry perfects what is too gross to be directly susceptible of artistic perfection. Art being the embodiment of ideals, industrial art is the active overcoming and molding of matter while liberal art gives to this content expression and meaning. Such a separation reflects Santayana's whole philosophy. Matter and essence, like the psyche and spirit, are mirrored in the aesthetic as content, which combines material and form, and expression.

Industrial art makes of pure matter a content susceptible to expression. Like all matter, the materials of art maintain an independent existence, but industry gives them their first being. It is man's first experience in the realm of matter just as fine art introduces him to the realm of essence. That essences should be realized in art as ideals requires a certain discrepancy between what is and what could be. Infinite potentialities underlie the chaos in Santayana. The "initial formlessness in matter is essential to art's existence."[50] That matter should be absolutely unformed favors art; the evil is that it should assume a form unpropitious to some ideal.[51]

Industry is the overcoming of such an evil, the removal of impediments to art. The function of industrial art is negative.

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[50] Ibid., 30.
[51] Ibid., 32.

It renders apt the meaningless, but like all instrumental values it partakes of intrinsic worth and shares in the ideal character of fine art. Technical skill is thus not entirely the slave's prerogative. Technique is also the prerogative of the man of genius.[52]

While the work of art is in reality spontaneous and unforseen, the idea of the result of one's industry may be called the purpose of the artist. A consciousness of aim pervades creation. This natural delusion is based on the frequency of man's satisfactions, the tendency of events to please and of works of art to be beautiful. Art is neither pure spontaneity nor utter determinism. It is the determining of the spontaneous. In the Life of Reason technique would justify itself and all spontaneous action would be relevant.[53] Arts "become nobler and more rational as their utility is rendered spontaneous or their spontaneity beneficent."[54] The automatic impulse of liberal art tends to lead fancy astray in the field of essences instead of co-ordinating instinct with existence. "Arts are instincts bred and reared in the open, creative habits acquired in the light of reason."[55]

Although to Santayana the spontaneous arts precede the useful,[56] great artistic creation is modified by contact with the world.[57] Since the first arts were not deliberately

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[52] Ibid., 37.
[53] Loc. cit.
[54] Loc. cit.
[55] Ibid., 5.
[56] Ibid., 37.
[57] Ibid., 39.

developed nor rationally justified, there has grown up a variety of fanciful beauties, enjoyable in themselves but segregated from actual life. Ceremonies, rituals, and religions pertain to this sphere. Religions are kinds of science whose application to the world it would be futile to attempt. Sciences can be appraised on the merits of their validity, but all religions are equally valid. They belong to the realm of essence. Thus Santayana reconciles his innate attachment to scholastic Catholicism with his realistic prejudice. The Virgin mother is an essence like the round square to be enjoyed in intuition. Its relevance to matters of fact is beside the point, and "it is a pity that a foolish iconoclasm should so long have deprived the Protestant mind of the contemplation of this ideal."[58]

Yet such an ideal is not a true work of art. It is a meaning which can find no suitable medium for expression, a wandering essence too complex for the habits of matter. Art conforms to the existence from which it arises. Dancing, for example, however symbolic it may become, retains always its first character of gesture.[59] Indeed this primary quality gives the dance its meaning, for gesture like speech indicates intent. Therefore the dance is a consciously rational expression and so can appeal to intuition. Its power is immense. "The massive

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[58] SB, 190.
[59] RA, 41.

suggestion, the pressure of the ambient will, is out of all proportion to the present call for action."[60]

As in the dance so in music the primary purpose is not aesthetic satisfaction but self-satisfaction.[61] At first vocal expression asserts itself with no ulterior motive. But its character of automatic response is subdued by time into an habitual custom. The reflection of memory ensues in conscious training and conditioning of expression. Like the spirit of man based on his psyche, the experience of music depends on man's physical capacity to distinguish and relate sounds. But if this were all, music would be a sort of mathematics. The peculiar quality of musical harmonies, however, is not their harmonious patterns, in which all art shares, but their duration in time, "a medium which appeals more than space to emotion."[62] Music is a part of life for we live through it. "It is not so much the music that moves as we that move with it."[63]

Yet besides its flux and movement, every tone has its proper essence and intrinsic worth. Some tones will be too extreme for the ear of man just as the delicacy of some chords will escape him and the nuance of a complex phrase exceed his sensibilities. Such unheard beauty is valueless to man. And so a symphony should not ignore the analytic and synoptic powers of its audience.[64] Santayana vigorously asserts the relativity of

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60 Ibid., 42.
61 Loc. cit.
62 Ibid., 46.
63 Ibid., 47.
64 Ibid., 51.

values. "Everything has its own value and sets up its price; but others must judge if that price is fair, and sociability is the condition of all rational excellence."[65] But although some types of music will appeal to different persons and so be of differing worth to them, every musical structure is beautiful just as every mathemetical proposition is true. "Pure music is pure art."[66]

Nevertheless, music is not an abstraction from life. It "can produce emotion as directly as can fighting or love."[67] Music acts immediately on the psyche which "touches the soul"[68] as its physical condition at every moment affects the spirit. And music is far more potent than mere experience. The musician can combine chords unknown to nature and fabricate melodies too intricate for the shifting winds. Life blurs the delicate discriminations of music which gives "form to what is naturally inarticulate."[69] Unlike the other arts music can express one essence completely. It can develop a theme. And this theme can be entirely apart from existence, for as an essence it will be good in itself and in need of no justification. Thus music fulfils man's desire to express incongrous feelings and impulses.

Originally speech too resembled music in its disdain of matters of fact.[70] The ideal existence of language preceded

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[65] Loc. cit.
[66] Ibid., 53.
[67] Ibid., 54.
[68] Loc. cit.
[69] Ibid., 56.
[70] Ibid., 70.

according to Santayana its realistic employment, for speech "must be a part of nature living its own life before it can become a symbol for the rest and bend to external control."[71] Music and language have their being in a medium removed from existential space, but an attachment growing up between words and events, the first came to symbolize the latter.

> The net of vocal relations caught [the] natural object as a cobweb might catch a fly, without destroying or changing it. The object's quality passed to the word at the same time that the word's relations enveloped the object; and thus a new weight and significancewas added to sound, previously nothing but a dull music.[72]

But events change as words do not, and the permanence of things is more in the words identifying them than in the ever-changing substances of the things themselves. The idea of sameness persisting through change is due to the imposition of ideals on matters of fact.[73] Understanding arises when "the actual flux is ideally suspended and an ideal harness is loosely flung upon things."[74] Words allow this fixation and interpretation; they resemble coins, particular and yet universal in their function. Thus, psychologically a word is a unique experience, but logically a word may have many contexts, and so "nominalism [is] right in psychology and realism in logic."[75]

Literature partakes of each field, for it combines the music and the meaning of words. Like music Santayana thinks it arose spontaneously, but unlike music it attempts to represent

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71 Loc. cit.
72 Loc. cit.
73 Ibid., 72.
74 Loc. cit.
75 Ibid., 74.

as well as to express. These two tendencies in literature are continually in conflict. The function of words pulls them into a strictly symbolic relation with existence while their origin impels a poetic exuberance and unbusinesslike fancy. This is merely to repeat that their function is logical and their origin psychological. The function of music does not transcend its origin while the function of mathematics entirely ignores its origin, but literature follows a mean path. Its symbolism retains a musical quality for all its significance.

> Irresponsible and trivial in its abstract impulse, man's simian chatter becomes noble as it becomes symbolic; its representative function lends it a serious beauty, its utility endows it with moral worth.[76]

There could be a pure language which like pure music would refrain from relvance to facts and would play forever on its own themes, but this would be only "pure experiment; and it is not strange that nine-tenths of it should be pure failure."[77] Santayana agrees with Plato that the inspiration of poets is mad and when this madness can find no suitable place in the public scheme of things Santayana too would demand that society expel what is harmful to its welfare. When novel, all words and expressions are poetic; prose is the end of poetry's evolution from inspiration to signification.[78]

Thus poetry appeals to emotion; prose, to analysis. In this decadence of language, as Santayana thinks the transition from

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[76] Ibid., 84.
[77] Ibid., 91.
[78] Ibid., 98.

poetry to prose to represent, the intrinsic has preceded the instrumental good. Prose, however, retains an intrinsic quality in its form, for prose is only prosaic as far as its content is concerned. Prose is applicable poetry. Were the form of prose to become prosaic, language would be as unconscious as breathing for of the utterly instrumental one is unaware. In a purely rational world the form of language would be poetical while its material was prosaic.

In one sense, nevertheless, even the material of prose remains poetic, for in our conception of the world a bias is necessary to every point of view, and the first foundation of a bias is poetical. Prose is the elaboration of such a bias into a symbolic representation of itself. This theory maintains Santayana's fundamental tendency to base reason on instinct. Even more than the feeling of success which prose imparts to dealings with the world does plastic construction give man a feeling of power and of influence over nature.[79] The two elements of construction are structure and ornament. Both have their own beauty and in a work of art their characteristics should blend. Construction is the basis for decoration and this is in turn the basis for representation, which contains the intellectual element in art.[80]

That is to say, representation is an intellectual process

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[79] Ibid., 116.
[80] Ibid., 142.

because all sensation and all ideas represent their objects, and artistic imitation is a prolongation of this phenomenon. Thus Santayana opposes the doctrine of art for art's sake. If art is to be representative, its subject is obviously of importance although, of course, the medium in which the subject will be portrayed may differ. Some subjects will be more adequate than others to certain media.[81]

Santayana believes sculpture to portray most completely the hero. Drama makes him transitory and at the same time destroys the morality of the actor who in acting loses his own personality. Sculpture, however, makes "firm and harmonious"[82] the imagined. But believing it to be obsolete, Santayana turns to painting, the portrayal of circumstances and incidents rather than of persons.

Painting is not a construct but an impression. It can only be looked at "in one light"[83] and arises when the beauty of an image causes it to linger in the mind.[84]

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[81] Ibid., 152.
[82] Ibid., 154.
[83] Ibid., 157.
[84] Ibid., 163.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Although reflection is a part of life, it is the last part.[1] Platonic intuitions are disloyal to the comprehension of substance in being the highest expression of it.[2] Yet all comprehension and knowledge is in a sense disloyal, for even in scientific theory, the adequacy of understanding depends on simplicity, that is to say, on its beauty.[3] While arts are "instincts bred and reared in the open,"[4] sciences achieve no more than symbolic representations of these instincts.[5] And just as religions represent planes of living,[6] so truths represent planes of comprehending or of awareness of living.

Logic describes aesthetics, which needs no justification itself, for the beautiful, like the world and like ourselves, is "an experience; there is nothing more to say about it. Indeed, if we look at things teleologically,... beauty is of all things what least calls for explanation."[7] From the teleological point of view, beauty is a rational poatulate similar to space and time and like them an element in the given. This final, ultimate, and unaccountable datum, however,

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1 SB, 11.
2 Ibid., 8.
3 Ibid., 139.
4 RA, 5.
5 Ibid., 84.
6 RR, 14.
7 SB, 268.

differs according as we regard it mechanistically or teleologically.

Nature for Santayana is mechanistic; man, teleological.[8] The truth of metaphysics applies to natural phenomena.[9] Ethics and aesthetics, which deal respectively with negative and positive data, occur in the purpose, progress, and culmination of the teleological self.[10] The psyche of metaphysics is a compound of objectified interests,[11] while the spirit of aesthetics is an actively willing individual.[12] The one is inert; the other, motivating.[13] Yet Santayana fails to completely objectify the psyche for he makes it sensible of "shock."[14] His metaphysic thus tends to pantheism just as his aesthetic approaches idealism. Only be repeated assertions of their interdependence does he maintain the naturalistic bias.[15]

The infinite potentialities of man are bounded by the circumstances of his experience. We are so constrained to life that other men are rather parts of our events than distinct selves.

> The serious and equable development of a plot has a more stable worth [than that of a character] in its greater similarity to life, which allows us to see other men's minds through the medium of events, and not events through the medium of other men's minds.[16]

Yet since these events are ours, objectivity becomes the

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8 RCS, 172.
9 SB, 184.
10 RCS, 1.
11 PSL, 66.
12 RM, 139.
13 RR, 15.
14 SAF, 145.
15 RS, 137.
16 SB, 176.

predication of those of our sensations which are coherent with "reality." And thus "the real world is merely the shadow of that assurance of eventual experience which accompanies sanity." Preference is irrational, and the good is what we desire.

Santayana's aesthetic manifests the good, and his metaphysic describes it. The world is valuable before it is understandable. Santayana presupposes no theory of correspondence between symbolic propositions and nature.[17] Nature is merely the interchange of potential and actual forces without significance.[18] The interpretation of Santayana aims at development[19] and at the emergence of beauty from a purposeless flux,[20] and he is rightly a poet rather than a philosopher. Had he elaborated a metaphysic from such a fundamental aesthetic impulse as that of Croce, he would still have aimed at truth. But Santayana both begins and ends with beauty, and truth is sandwiched between where its savour is lost.

Santayana would have nature the basis of man's goal, but instead nature becomes one of man's goals. The function of imagination adapts itself to a mechanical environment. In fine art, however, man has adapted nature to his acquired functions.[21] It is not strange, then, to find in Santayana a harmony between nature and experience, when nature is the imaginable and when

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[17] RR, 18.
[18] RS, 30.
[19] SB, 165.
[20] RCS, 193.
[21] SB, 165, footnote.

reason is satisfied by the sense of beauty.

> When our senses and imagination find what they crave, when the world so shapes itself or so mouls the mind that the correspondence between them is perfect, then perception is pleasure, and existence needs no apology.[22]

Existence being essentially substantial and art the essence of substance, beauty becomes substance's prerogative. Indeed, three categories seem to delineate themselves in Santayana.

Logic concerns the truth of essences; morals, the goodness of matter; and art, the beauty of substance. Morals and art are perhaps preferable to the more graceful terms, ethics and aesthetics, for these, as we ordinarily consider them, deal with essences and approach the realm of truth. Discourse itself deals with essences,[23] and Santayana believes ethics and aesthetics to be matters of events or situations,[24] so that he denies himself the metaphysical right of discussing the sense of beauty. But perhaps a eulogy was all he intended.

Although a non-believer, he remains a Platonist and, like those catholic scholastics whom he resembles, seeks the verification of the Philosophicus. But apprecistive enjoyment as well as thoughtful understanding lies in the realm of substance and need not attempt Icarean flights. Santayana's certainty that beauty and truth are the ultimate goods hypostatises these concepts and manifests their essences instead of explaining them.

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[22] Ibid., 269.
[23] RE, 4.
[24] RA, 28.

Although the world is susceptible of intelligibility and beauty, Santayana holds that to suspect it of falsity or ugliness is to hypostatise non-entities. These non-existents, however, are as eternally essences as any others. And the very event which makes one proposition forever true makes the contradictory statement forever false. The system of Santayana contains the same eudaemonistic teleology as did Aristotle's,[25] but in addition to the negativity of evil, error itself is a biological accident.[26] Santayana is fundamentally optimistic, because only man's momentary inadequacy leads to beauty by way of the avoidance of evils.

The will of man is so harmonious that its unification lies at the basis of the unity man sees in nature,[27] And the experience which he cannot systematize as spatial, man still unifies as mental. "The 'secondary qualities' are relegated to a personal inconsequential region; they constitute the realm of appearance, the realm of mind."[28] This realm is inconsequential because of its independence and far more important than sensuous reality which "perishes as it goes."[29]

The existence of other men, however, necessitates the use of man's two capacities of perception and imagination. Other beings are inferred neither by analogy nor by a sort of mystical intuition[30] as is frequently asserted. The abstraction

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25 SB, 156-157.
26 COUS, 101.
27 RCS, 123.
28 Ibid., 126.
29 Ibid., 132.
30 Ibid., 139-140.

of objects and subjects occurs only after long reflection upon the world of chaos. Originally experience combines all its qualities.[31] We believe in other selves because "before they are conceived to be merely material, [they] are conceived to possess all the qualities which our own consciousness possesses when we behold them."[32] We and nature, then, are so interrelated that even the abstraction of ourselves from the world is the signal of sophistication. Science itself omits the initial mythology of man's life.

Pragmatically, other selves exist by analogy. Pragmatism, however, tests the truth rather than reveals it, and the revelation by which men recognize their fellows is a case of the pathetic fallacy.[33] Yet on this occasion such a fallacy is valid, for the tertiary qualities of similar objects do correspond, says Santayana.

Nevertheless, in spite of the human being's emotional aspect, a reasonable harmony pervades his aims. The fleeting impression is the substance of reality, and desire the occasion of man's ideals.[34]

> An ideal representing no living interest would be irrelevant to perception which should not be composed of the materials that sense supplies, or should not re-embody actual sensations in an intelligible system.[35]

Thus all ideals are reconcilable in the Life of Reason, which

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31 Ibid., 142.
32 Loc. cit.
33 Ibid., 159.
34 Ibid., 257.
35 Ibid., 259-260.

"constitute a single formal interest, the interest in harmony."[36] Art rests on experience, and "a happy result can be secured in art, as in life, only by intelligence."[37] Intelligence is the equilibrium between impulse and environment. We are practical failures when we disregard the original impulse of our wills; we are aesthetic failures when we ignore the conditions of reality. "Art is simply an adequate industry"[38] and "the best instrument of happiness."[39] "The emergence of arts out of instincts is the token and exact measure of nature's success and of mortal happiness."[40] The aesthetic element is integrated in the totality of man's experience, but thought and action are beautiful in the defining pauses of their harmony. The severest utility adapts itself to beauty.

Non-existent, immutable, and separate essences distinguish themselves from the conjunction of actual, irrelevant, and interacting events, and as our view changes we see the beauty, tragedy, and comedy of life. As we are aesthetic, moral, or practical beings, nature is correspondingly "lyrical in its ideal essence, tragic in its fate, and comic in its existence."[41]

Santayana's aesthetic, like a Leibnizian monad, reflects on its own scale the pattern of the whole system. Everything intermingles and overlaps in existence and in essence is rigidly separate. So art is a unity which on analysis falls

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36 Ibid., 267.
37 RA, 222.
38 Ibid., 223.
39 Ibid., 229.
40 Ibid., 230.
41 SE, 142.

into three distinct categories - form, material, and expression. Santayana believes that these are legitimate distinctions, and moreover each element is self-sustaining. Their co-existence in art resembles that of essence, matter, and substance in metaphysics and that of beauty, morality, and knowledge in experience. So also the analysis of works of art into content (material and form) and value (expression) reflects Santayana's first distinction of man as psyche and spirit.

Although Santayana is admittedly unconcerned with the coherence of his thought, he achieves a singularly forceful unity which it has been the purpose of this paper to demonstrate.

SUMMARY

The Introduction states the aim, scope, and content of the thesis and defines the most important of Santayana's terms. Santayana himself formulates no system, but his ideas will be co-ordinated as their significance would seem to warrant.

The second chapter shows the influence of such a temperament as that of Santayana in constructing a "Life of Reason" based on emotion. Following the scholastic tradition the human being is composed of two elements - animal faith and intuition, psyche and spirit. The finite exists; the infinite is. Yet there is a continual ingression of the one into the other, effecting knowledge and art.

The intuition of the spirit is necessary to knowledge, while the animal faith of the psyche prevents too complete absorption in the abstract. Animal faith allows for the beginnings of art, and intuition accounts for the perception of forms. Intuition leads to beauty; animal faith, to art. In experience the two are fused, and it is difficult to say whether we are rational because we can abstract terms from our knowledge or emotional because knowledge deals with events and situations. The chart in the Introduction illustrates the manner in which Santayana first reconciles his dualism and then abstracts a further division from the synthesis. The third column represents man's experience. It is evident that Santayana looks at reality as of a nature to reflect its dualism on every level of experience.

The category of things represents, of course, works of art. They are materialized essences and presuppose a universe of anterior divisions of reflection and action. Reflection is the analytic power; action, the unifying. Reflection uncovers essences while action burries them in existence. Santayana thus reconciles pluralism and monism. Both are true because both apply to experience, and lacking either experience would cease.

The experience of beauty is defined as "objectified pleasure," Santayana in this way hypostatising a subjective satisfaction of instinct. The "murmur of nature, wayward and narcotic" fuses with the "power to see things as they are"[1] as Santayana arrives at the dualism of his aesthetic. This theory of expression is in brief the association of form and material, the Aristotelian principles of Association by contiguity and by similarity. Expression necessitates intelligence and feeling. Happiness is a social phenomenon, but beauty is individual. The pleasure called beauty is the individual's relating of fact and fancy or, what is the same thing, his power of expression.

Chapter III describes the aesthetic activity, arising when teleological events occur in the mechanistic system. Value and ideals or Aristotelian entelechies are considered. The origin of art in morality is discussed. Art arises when man controls his environment. Moral endeavor overcomes the industrial stage of nature and makes liberal art possible. The specific

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1 COUS, 111.

arts are surveyed and their unique beauties considered.

The Conclusion estimates the relation of man's sense of beauty to his other senses. Logic, ethics, and aesthetics are considered. Poetry, tragedy, and comedy are seem to represent the essences of aesthetics, morality, and existence.

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